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x.

RESPONSE TO STATEMENTS OF FACT IN
THE UNIVERSITY'S BRIEF
Certain mischaracterizations of the facts set forth in tae
university's brief must be corrected before replying to arguments
which are based on those facts.
not seriously assailed any of

t~e

The remaining respondents have
facts as originally described

by the broker-dealers on these appeals.
The University asserts in its brief (at 4-5) that, contrary to
the broker-dealers' assertions, the broker-dealers recommended numerous stocks to the University for purchase.

What the University

fails to state is that the transactions which the University asserts
were "recommended" by the broker-dealers, whatever that term may
mean,

*

constitute only a fraction of the hundreds of purchases and

sales executed by the Universi,ty during the course of its investment
program.

(These four broker-dealers' opening brief, at 4).

The University also devotes considerable time to questioning
the origins and nature of the University's investment program as
detailed in the broker-dealers' original brief.
however, begs the question:

That discussion,

What is still uncontroverted is that the

University made a threshold decision to adopt an investment program
to place its non-interest bearing funds in securities.

The para-

mount goal of that program, as copiously documented in the broker-

*
The University relies on an affidavit filed by Donald Catron in
support of its assertion that every stock purchased through Hornblower was "recommended" to him by that broker.
The meaning of the
term "recommended" as used by Mr. Catron is unclear and does not
effectively controvert Hornblower's affidavit that it nonetheless
acted only as an agent for the University on every single transaction in question.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-1Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

dealers' original brief, was to depart from investments in fixed
income securities to equities in the hope of relatively high long
term return.

The University does not controvert these facts.

Similarly, while the University contends at some length that (11
the Institutional Council did not discuss the January 20, 1972 resolution at all before approving it and (2) some Council members
criticized the program from an early date, neither of these assertions is of any avail to the University.

First of all, that the

Council should have formally approved a resolution authorizing purchases on margin without having discussed it first seems hardly to
speak well for the level of fiduciary responsibility exercised by the
Council on behalf of the University.

second, this assertion makes

the broker-dealers' point that University officials failed to exercise any reasonable care before launching into this massive investment program.

Third, it is still uncontroverted that the full

Council was presented with regular reports on all phases of the
investment program; that a few Council members were indeed critical
of that program at various points has no legal relevance except to
the extent it highlights the irresponsibility of the full Council's
failure to re-evaluate that program or to seek the advice of the
Attorney General regarding the legality of that program.

This only

further emphasizes that it was the full Council which was responsible for monitoring, implementing, and approving the program as it
was carried out.
Two final points raised in the University's statement of facts
merit treatment here.

First, the University apparently concedes that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the Council never sought the advice of the Attorney General regarding
the legality of the program, but attempts to shift the responsibility
for that inquiry to the broker-dealers.

However, as a matter of

law (argued in these four broker-dealers' opening brief on appeal, at
35 n.21), when the broker-dealers posed the express issues of the
University's capacity and authority to purchase stock to the Institutional Council, by asking the Council for assurances of the University's power, they were relieved of any obligation they might otherwise have had to make such inquiry.
Second, the University devotes some discussion to the fact that
officers of two Logan banks read a December 15, 1972 article in the
Logan Herald-Journal which reported the Attorney General's tentative
opinion that the University's investment program was illegal.

This

discussion is entirely pointless, as the University does not and
cannot contend that any of those bank officers so advised the brokers,
all of whom except one (Merrill Lynch, which by then had ceased dealing with the University) had no offices in Utah, and none of whom
had offices or agents in Logan.

Indeed, it is uncontroverted that

the broker-dealers did not know the University was acting unlawfully,
assuming it was, in purchasing the securities at issue, nor were
they aware of any fact which might have led them to believe the
University's investments were unlawful.*

*

Merrill Lynch, R. 1433 (Stromberg Affidavit);. id. at 1422
(Dunn Affidavit); Bear Stearns, R. 1998 (Cranston Affidavit); Vol.
22, R. 1975 (Kaplan Affidavit for Hornblower); Sutro, R. 122
(Juda Affidavit).
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ARGUMENT
PART ONE
THE UNIVERSITY MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO RECOVER
AGAINST THESE BROKER-DEALERS, AND THE BROKERDEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE
A CLAIM SHOULD BE GRANTED.
INTRODUCTION

In its prefatory argument (University brief at 14-15), the
University attempts to shift the issue presented here from the question of relative liability as between the broker-dealers and the
University to a focus on who should bear liability of loss as between
the broker-dealers and the Utah taxpayers, who of course are not
parties to this suit.

The University understandably attempts to

shift the issue because the taxpayers are innocent of any wrongdoing,
and the policy issue thus posed would focus on who should bear the
risk of loss as between two equally innocent parties, the taxpayers
or the broker-dealers.

In fact, however, it is not the taxpayers who

seek recovery here, but the University, and as between that plaintiff
and these broker-dealers, the only proper inquiry is indeed whether
the University (and its responsible officers) should bear the risk of
these losses after expressly warranting the propriety of these invest·
ments to the broker-dealers, or whether instead the broker-dealers,
their innocent agents, should bear those losses.
This point deserves some treatment because the trial court also
mischaracterized the issue presented in the same way as has the
University.

Both in its decisions denying the broker-dealers' first

motions to dismiss and in its order granting the University's motions

-4-
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for partial summary judgment, the trial court expressly noted that
these transactions involve "monies placed [with Utah State University] by the taxpayers" and that there are "more than two parties
interested in this matter • . • and that is the taxpayers whose money
was used in these transactions and whose money was lost by reason of
these transactions."*
It is true that some yet-undefined portion of the funds invested
by the University came from taxpayer monies as opposed to private
donations, and Utah taxpayers have therefore suffered some indirect
loss by reason of the University's investment program.

This consti-

tutes no reason, however, for requiring these broker-dealers to
shoulder the responsibility for the University's losses.

It must

be recalled that any time a private party prevails against a government entity on a damages claim, it is the taxpayers who must ultimately
shoulder that burden.**

Sue~ cases demonstrate a salutary and well-

established judicial determination that such losses should be spread
in small increments among a large population rather than forcing one
innocent private party to indemnify all taxpayers against the misconduct or excesses of authority of public officials.
Indeed, this Court has recently taken occasion to expand at some
length upon the proper allocation of loss in suits involving the
government and private parties and has expressly announced that the
government is in the future to be subject to broader fiscal responsibility for its conduct and misconduct.

*

In Standiford v. Salt Lake

Merrill Lynch, R. 396-97; Bear Stearns, R. 2185-86.

**

Such recovery is, of course, authorized by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1 to -34 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
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City corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), Justice Stewart noted that
the purpose of that decision was "to narrow governmental immunity"
and that, as a result, it "should allow more innocent victims injured
by tortious conduct on the part of public entities access to the
courts for redress.

Fewer such people will be mercilessly and

senselessly barred from recovery for their injuries sustained at
the hands of the entities designed to serve them."

Id. at 1237.

As in Standiford, the issue presented in these cases requires
judicial determination of the best way to allocate loss between
private individuals and government.

In Standiford, the rule an-

nounced will have the effect of increasing expenditures of public
funds to satisfy private claims.
these cases:

The Court need not go so far in

I
I

!

all these brokers ask is that the Court adopt a paral-

lel policy (similarly allocating risk to the government rather than
to the private party) which would preclude private parties from
shouldering public losses in instances where the private party is
guilty of no wrongdoing and where high government officers induced
him to act on express warranties.

A ruling against the brokers on

these appeals would be diametrically inconsistent with the policy of
government responsibility adopted in Standiford.
POINT I
CONTRARY TO RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS, THIS CASE IS
NEITHER CONTROLLED NOR GUIDED BY THE HOLDING OF
FIRST EQUITY.
The University relies primarily upon the holding of First Equi_!y
Corp. v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975).

The issue

'

•

present in that case was the enforceability of an executory ultra
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•

J..'

vires contract in the absence of any official warranty of the legality of the contract.

Here, the issue is whether payments made in

good faith pursuant to fully executed contracts and pursuant to
official warranties of their legality, but later found to be ultra
vires, can be recovered.

While the University attempts to character-

ize this distinction as "relying ostrich-like on the technical meaning of the language employed," Respondent's Brief at 34, it is in
fact a distinction that many courts have found not only valid but
fundamental.
Even if the University had not assured the broker-dealers of the
University's power to purchase the securities at issue, the University would still not be entitled to recover on executed contracts
which were ultra vires.

A paradigm case illustrating the distinction

between executory and executed contracts of this kind is Tobin v. Town
Council, 45 Wyo. 219, 17 P.2d 666 (1933).

There, plaintiff was a

contractor who had graded and gravelled several city streets under a
written contract.

After he had received approximately half the money

due him under the contract, a new council repudiated the agreement,
contending that it violated state statutes requiring
bidding.

·~ompetitive

The plaintiff sued to recover the balance due him, and the

city counterclaimed for the money already paid, contending that as a
matter of law, it must recover illegally spent tax funds.

The par-

ties agreed that the work done could not be undone -- the city was to
have the full benefit of plaintiff's labor.
The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed with the city that the balance
still due on the contract could not be recovered.

After determining

that the contract had indeed been let in violation of the competitive
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bidding statute, the court observed:
Provisions of this kind must be so administered
and construed as fairly and reasonably to accomplish their vitally important purpose. Only by
sternly insisting upon positive obedience thereto as mandatory provisions of law have the courts
found that the policy they uphold may be maintained. We deem it unwise to relax this policy,
concededly an extremely valuable safeguard to
the taxpayers of the municipalities of this state.
17 P.2d at 669.
Therefore, the court held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff
could not enforce the contract in question to recover the unpaid
balance of the price. Id.

That is the fact situation of First Equity,

and the holding is precisely consistent.
But the city's counterclaim to recover money already paid stood
on quite a different- footing.

The court said:

The action presented by the counterclaim before
us is essentially an action for money had and
received.
It is generally the case in such a
proceeding that, in the absence of mistake, deceit,
fraud, duress, oppression, or undue influence, the
parties seeking to recover must be equitably entitled to a repayment of the money or no recovery
can be had or repayment compelled • . . .
The equitable principles thus governing the
counterclaim at bar for the recovery of the money
paid by the town have been applied as well to
proceedings brought by municipal corporations as to
those instituted by ordinary suitors.
Id. at 674.
The court further held that the improper expenditure of taxpayers'
money was an insufficient equitable basis to compel the contractor
to forfeit all compensation for the work he had performed. Id. at 678.
The two branches of Tobin illustrate vividly the fallacy in
plaintiff's contention that First Equity is controlling here.
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As

the first branch of Tobin holds, money owed under a void contract
cannot be recovered.

But as the second branch of Tobin holds, money

already paid under such a contract cannot be recovered.

First

Equity is analogous to the first branch of Tobin, this case to the
second.

As Tobin shows, those critical factual distinctions yield

different results.
The same distinctions were present in Frederick v. Douglas
County, 96 Wis. 411, 71 N.W. 798 (1897).

There, the county had hired

Grace, an attorney, to handle a substantial amount of tax litigation
beyond the expertise of the county attorney, and had made partial
payment for services rendered.

This arrangement was eventually

challenged by a taxpayer on the basis that the county had no statutory authority to hire assistants for its attorney.

The plaintiff

taxpayer sought to have Grace return all the money that had been paid
to him, and the trial court 'so ordered.
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the contract with Grace
was beyond the authority of the county to make, and that Grace therefore could not be paid for the balance of the services he had rendered.

However, the court denied any recovery of money already paid.

The opinion, which merits quotation at some length, states:
The evidence and the findings show that Mr.
Grace's employment began in January, 1895, and
it was a matter of public notoriety, and the plaintiff himself and presumably all taxpayers who kept
track of the public proceedings knew that he was
employed as early as the spring of 1895; that he
performed large and valuable services, for which
he was from time to time paid; and that not only
he, but the county board, acted in entire good
faith in the matter.
• • • Mr. Grace's services
ran through a number of months, and he undoubtedly
has fully earned all the money which has been paid
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him. During all this time the plaintiff and his
fellow taxpayers remained silent, and allowed the
services to be rendered and the money to be paid.
They took no action until the latter part of
November, 1895. Then they came into a court of
equity, and asked for the stoppage of all payments
in the future, and to this they are undoubtedly
entitled. But he who comes into a court of equity
must do equity. Could it, under any view of the
circumstances, be said to be equitable to compel
Mr. Grace to pay back the money which he received
for long and valuable labors, rendered honestly and
in good faith, the benefit of which the corporation
has received, and concerning which the taxpayers
• • • were, or ought to have been, fully informed
during their entire progress? Were a court of
equity to make this judgment under the circumstances,
we should regard it as having become an engine of
oppression, rather than an instrument of justice.
We do not rest this decision entirely upon the
ground that the remedy has been lost by laches, or
that the county has become estopped, but upon the
ground that under all the circumstances, the plaintiff having invoked the relief of a court of equity,
that court, in granting the relief, will not take
away the fruit of honest labor.
71 N.W. at 802-03 (emphasis added).
In State v. Fronizer, 77 Ohio St. 7, 82 N.E. 518 (1907), the
state sought to recover partial payments made to a bridge builder.
It was undisputed that the bridges in question were built and repaired in workmanlike fashion, acceptable to the county on whose behalf
the state was bringing suit.

However, the contracts involved were

void because the county auditor had not certified that sufficient
funds were available, as required by law.

The court, incisively charac·

terizing the contracts in question as "void [but not] tainted," held:
This court is of opinion that such recovery is not
authorized. The principle applicable to the situation is the equitable one that where one has acquired possession of the property of another through
an unauthorized and void contract, and has paid for
the same, there can be no recovery back of the
money paid without putting, or showing readiness to

-10-
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put, the other party in statu quo, and that rule
controls this case unless such recovery is plainly
authorized by the statute. The rule rests upon
that principle of common honesty that imposes an
obligation to do justice upon all persons, natural
as well as artificial, and is recognized in many
cases.
82 N.E. at 520-21 (emphasis added).
In Village of Pillager v. Hewitt, 98 Minn. 265, 107 N.W. 815
(1906), the city sought to recover payments made to a bridge builder

!

under a void contract.

1

contract was void.

1

·~

City officials had inspected and accepted the

bridge, but had refused to pay the balance due on the ground that
In holding that the city could not recover pay-

ments made pursuant to a void contract, the court stated,
It may be conceded that the defendant could not
have maintained an action on the contract to recover the contract price for the bridge, although
he had fully performed the contract on his part;
for upon the grounds of sound public policy the doctrine of ultra vires is applied with greater strictness to municipal than to private corporations.
This, however, is an'action, in the nature of an
action for money had and received, which is based
upon equitable principles, to recover back the
consideration paid by the plaintiff to the defendant for building a bridge which was accepted by it,
and which fully complied with the terms of the
contract. The fact that the bridge was afterwards
carried away by a flood is not material, for it was
not due to any fault of the defendant or any one
else. . • • The defendant in good faith received
the money and bonds in payment of the bridge which
he had built for the plaintiff. The consideration
for such payment was full and fair, and, in equity
and good conscience, it ought to have been made by
the plaintiff. Such being the case, it would be
most inequitable and unconscionable to compel the
defendant to return the money and bonds paid to him
. . • and we hold that the plaintiff cannot maintain
this action to recover them.
107 N.W. at 816.

-11-
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The same doctrine was squarely recognized by this court in
Moe v. Millard County School Dist., 54 Utah 144, 179 P. 980 (1919).
There, the school district resisted paying a balance due on a contract for the installation of heating, plumbing, and ventilating
fixtures on the basis that the district had exceeded its constitutional debt limit, but it wanted to retain the fixtures in question.
The plaintiff contractor sought to remove them, and offered to return
the money he had already been paid if he were allowed to do so.

This

court, invoking the equitable doctrines previously discussed, held:
We cannot perceive the necessity of refunding the
money that was paid as aforesaid. To that extent
the contract has been executed, and there certainly is no good reason why in equity that matter
should be reopened. Nor is it necessary to do
that in order to reflect justice between the parties • • • . The only question therefore is: To
what extent shall plaintiff be permitted to remove his property? In our judgment he should only
be permitted to remove so much thereof in value as
has not been paid for and no more.
Id. at 151-52, 179 P. at 983.

While the relief sought by the parties

in Moe was somewhat different .than that sought in the cases from
other jurisdictions, the result was identical

equity allowed the

party that had performed to retain the fruits of his labors.
The efforts made to distinguish the Moe case have been unconvincing.

In a memorandum decision, Judge Christoffersen tried to

distinguish the case in the proceedings below by saying:
[D]efendants here argue that because Moe was not
required to return the partial payment this is
authority that Utah State cannot recover payments
made to the brokers on commissions or other losses.
However, this would be a case where the school
would enjoy the benefits of the plumbing and heat-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

ing materials installed plus a return of their
partial payment which is not the case here. The
University does not seek to return the stocks and
receive back their payments for the same . • • .
University's Brief at 39.

This statement may be literally true, but

is somewhat misleading, in that it implies that the University has
offered to return the stocks.
liquidated them.

To the contrary, the University

Surely, distinguishing between the retention of the

specific benefits conferred (i.e., receipt of securities and the
opportunity for gain or risk of loss) and the retention of those
benefits in another form (i.e., money after liquidating the securities) is legally meaningless.
The University asserts that Moe is distinguishable because, as
the court noted, the school district could at a later time have
entered into a valid contract with the plaintiff.

It is clear,

however, that that remark was nothing more than a suggestion on how
the school district might avoid the waste it claimed would result
from removal of the fixtures.

Id. at 150, 179 P. at 983.

It is

plain that the capacity of parties to enter into a second contract
has no effect on the legal validity of the first.

It is submitted

that the trial court and the University cannot properly distinguish
Moe from the present case.

They have told us how it is different (in

effect, only that plumbing equipment is different than securities),
but they have stated no reasons whatsoever why the factual distinctions between this case and Moe ought to lead to a different outcome.
The important distinction, which the University attempts to
belittle, is between these related appeals and First Equity.

-13-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is

simply this:

While the law may occasionally require a harsh and

unjust result (and the University concedes at page 73 of its brief
that the result in First Equity was harsh), equity will not sanction
it.

The law may prevent the prospective enforcement of a contract

entered into in good faith, but equity will not allow a public entity
to stand idly by, reap the benefits of another's labor, and then rob
him retroactively of his just compensation.

First Equity was con-

trolled by and decided under a law harsh in its application.
case presents an appeal to equity and conscience.

This

In dismissing that

distinction as meaningless and technical the University asks this
Court to ignore the very existence and purpose of equity jurisprudence.
POINT II
MONEY RECEIVED FOR SERVICES RENDERED UNDER A GOOD
FAITH CONTRACT CANNOT BE RECOVERED WHILE RETAINING
THE BENEFITS OF THOSE SERVICES.
Throughout its brief the University has asserted that "public
monies expended pursuant to unlawful contracts may be recovered"
(~,at

24).

It has cited a myriad of cases (most of which are

simply string citations) which assertedly agree with that proposition, perhaps hoping that by the sheer weight of this "authority" it
may convince this Court to abandon any notions of fair play in resolving these cases.

While replete with citations, the University's

brief is short on convincing authority, and for good reason.

Aside

from occasional bits of dicta or obiter dicta, the cited cases, with
few exceptions, simply fail to support the University's position.

-14-
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Because of the bulk of the University's citations, the brokerdealers will not distinguish each of those cases at this point.
Rather, we invite the attention of the Court to Appendix "A" of this
brief, which is devoted in its entirety to an analysis of the facts
and holdings of each of the cases cited by the University from pages
24 through 32 of its brief, and which demonstrates cumulatively that
those cases are no authority for the University's position.
In addition to its "authority" for the proposition that public
bodies may also recover ultra vires payments, distinguished in the
Appendix to this brief, the University has made several other assertions subsumed within that general topic which bear response here:
(1) the University erroneously contends that the brokers have conceded that they owe commissions to the. University;

(2) the University

appears to posit much of its argument on the unfounded claim that the
courts treat "illegal" contracts differently than "ultra vires" contracts;

(3) the University claims that the general rule prohibiting

recovery on illegal contracts is not applicable to public entities
and that public bodies are exempt from the general principle that
payments made under mistake of law cannot be recovered.

Each of

these assertions will be treated in turn.
1.

The University May Not Recover Commission Payments.

The broker-dealers have never conceded that they are liable to
the University for commissions which they received.

Precedents

abound which declare that a party making voluntary payments under
mistake of law, including commission payments, may not recover.*

*

~. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U.S. 541, 543-44
(1878); City of Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720,
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Mistaken payments to brokers are no exception to this rule.
In Buschbaum v. Barron, 1 N.J. Super. 4, 61 A.2d 512 (N.J.
super. ct. App. Div. 1948), plaintiff sued to recover a commission
already paid to a broker, on the ground that under New Jersey law
the broker was not entitled to a commission from that particular
transaction.

The court denied relief, holding that

[g]enerally, the one who has made the payment
[in an illegal bargain] is not entitled to
restitution. The entire transaction had been
executed. Plaintiff received from defendant
full performance and paid only what he promised
to pay. Plaintiff showed no basis for relief.
61 A.2d at 513. *
Similarly, in Richardson v. Roberts, 210 Cal. App. 2d 603, 26
Cal. Rptr. 829 (Dis. Ct. App. 1962), a real estate broker sued to
recover portions of his commissions which he had voluntarily paid to
the defendant as consideration for obtaining loans for the broker's
clients.

The plaintiff argued that these payments were illegal

since the defendant was not properly licensed.

The court agreed

that the payments were unlawful, but held for the defendant, reasoning as follows:

"In the case at bar the contract is fully executed

and there is no valid claim that defendant's performance was in any
way deficient ••

'There is no equitable reason for invoking

restitution when the plaintiff gets the exchange which he expected.'"
26 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (citations omitted).

The University has not

alleged that the broker-dealers' performance was in any way deficient.

The University has not alleged that it got from the exchange

anything other than what it expected.

Therefore, there is no reason

*

Accord, Messner v. Union County, 34 N.J. 233, 167 A.2d 897,
898 (1901).'"
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for it to invoke restitution.

Indeed, equity cries for a contrary

result.
when the United States Supreme Court faced a case involving a
broker and an already executed contract which the petitioning foreign
corporation could not legally carry out, the Court declared:
The respondent [broker] is not to be deprived of
his compensation simply because petitioner found
itself unable to consummate the latter contract
by reason of its inability to perform a condition
made necessary by the provisions of the law of
another country.
Even if the contract of sale was void by
British law, all other questions aside, respondent's connection with it was not such as to
deprive him of his commission.
Gaston, Williams & Wigmore v. Warner, 260 U.S. 202, 204, 67 L.Ed.
210, 213

(1922).

The broker-dealers are similarly situated.

Their principal,

the University, claims that its transactions are void.

If that

contention is accurate, the.case just cited compels the conclusion
that the broker-dealers are entitled to their compensation regardless.
Furthermore, the University is not entitled to recover commissions from these broker-dealers because they reasonably and in good
faith changed their position in reliance upon the regularity of the
transactions here at issue.

On hundreds of occasions, the broker-

dealers received payment and commissions from the University for its
purchases.

The broker-dealers passed on the purchase price of each

security to the sellers, retaining only their commissions as their
benefit of the bargain.

Those commission payments were then paid out

through the ordinary course of business to satisfy their regular
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

expenses.

In so doing, the broker-dealers reasonably and in good

faith changed their position in reliance upon the regularity of these
transactions, and the University may not now recover monies delivered
to the broker-dealers which have long since been dispersed.
In a case cited by the University in support of its position,
~aricopa

County v. Cities & Towns of Avondale, 12 Ariz. App. 109, 467

P.2d 949 (Ct. App. 1970), the court denied recovery to the public
entity of funds paid out through a mistake of law, since the defendant had changed its position in reliance upon the regularity of the
transactions there at issue.

After noting the "general rule" that

public bodies may recover funds mistakenly paid out, the court stated,
No claimant, however, has an absolute right to
restitution for an enriching benefit, mistakenly
conferred. Comment c under § 1 of the Restatement
of Restitution states:
"Even where a person has received the
benefit from another, he is liable to pay
therefor only if the circumstances of its
receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him
to retain it."
467 P.2d at 953.
2.

There Is No Meaningful Distinction Between "Ultra Vires"

and "Illegal" Contracts.
The University further contends (at 35-36) that there exists
some distinction in the law between "ultra vires" and "illegal" contracts, so that the general rule denying recovery on illegal contracts is not a rule applicable to ultra vires contracts.

The Uni-

versity cites no authority in support of this impossible semantic
distinction, as indeed no such authority exists.

-18-

As the term "ultra
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vires" literally means "outside the law," there certainly can be no
distinction between ultra vires and illegal contracts.
3.

The General Rule Prohibiting Recovery on Illegal Contract

Payments Made Under Mistake of Law Applies to Public Entities.
The University then asserts, however, that the general rules
prohibiting recovery on illegal contracts are not applicable to public
bodies (at 36-37).

Similarly, the University asserts that public

bodies are not subject to the general rule that payments under mistake of law are not recoverable.

We will respond to those assertions

as one, as there is no logical reason to distinguish between them:
The older cases supporting these propositions are simply further
examples of the "special treatment" sometimes historically accorded
to the government for reasons which are increasingly being discarded
by the courts.
As is true of the

trad~tional

notion that the government could

not be estopped, or principles denying recovery against the state
because of sovereign immunity, all "special treatment" of the government which forces private parties to bear the risk of government
misconduct are in the process of being reversed, at least where the
government acts (as it has here) in a clearly proprietary capacity.
Under such circumstances, a public party will be subject to the same
rules of equity and fairness as a similarly situated private party.
For this same reason, the broker-dealers also should not be liable to
the University for payments which they received, since the University
made those payments in a proprietary capacity, and it should therefore be subject to the same rules of contract as were enunciated in
the cases cited above on that issue.
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The broker-dealers argued at some length in their opening brief
that the University should not be allowed to recover on executed
contracts even if they are ultra vires, and that ultra vires payments
made under mistake of law cannot be recovered.
at 41-45.

Appellants' Brief

Those authorities have not been refuted by the University

and will not be reiterated.

One of those assertions, however, bears

mention because it has not been controverted at all:

Like the United

States, the State of Utah is subject to the commercial law applicable
to contracts between private individuals when it engages in commercial activity.

It matters not whether the contracting party is the

federal government, a state, a municipality, or a private citizen.
Appellants' Brief at 45.
A ruling for the broker-dealers on these appeals expressly adopting that principle would be the only result consistent with this
court's recent ruling in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230 (Utah 1980), which held that henceforth governmental entities in
Utah will be subjected to a higher standard of responsibility for
their own misconduct.*
The broker-dealers respectfully urge this Court to adopt a
principle of sovereign responsibility in these cases which would hold
the government responsible for its own conduct when acting in a proprietary or rather non-governmental capacity (as that term was recently defined in Standiford).

In all such instances, the government

*

The court there held that it would abandon the traditional
sovereign-proprietary distinction in resolving the question of
government immunity, a result which recognizes that "a governmental
entity, like individuals and private entities, should be liable for
an injury inflicted by it." 605 P.2d at 1234. As this court there
recognized; the doctrine of sovereign immunity "was itself largely
unsound:" Id. Similarly, related doctrines which afford special
pr~tection
to the sovereign, including all of those upon which the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Services and Technology
Act, administered unsound,
by the Utah State Library.
University hereLibrary
relies,
are equally
and for the same reasons.
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should then be responsible for its own torts and likewise should be
precluded from shifting liability for losses onto innocent private
parties.

Such a ruling would be consistent with law already announ-

ced by other courts.
For example, in Hunke v. Foote, 84 Id. 391, 373 P.2d 322 (1962),
the Idaho Supreme Court held a municipality subject to the same rules
applicable to private parties because the government was acting in a
proprietary capacity, explaining that:
When operating in its proprietary capacity a
municipal corporation is subject to the same
burdens, responsibilities and liabilities as a
private corporation or individual acting in the
same capacity.
373 P.2d at 323.

And in City of High Point v. Duke Power Co., 120

F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1941), the court held that the city could not
recover amounts paid for electrical power in excess of its legal
liability, explaining:
And it has been held, and quite properly we think,
that even in jurisdictions where a municipal corporation is permitted to recover voluntary payments,
the rule will not be applied in c.ase of payments
made in its private and proprietary capacity.
Id. at 869.
Perhaps the clearest expression of the policy issues raised
here and of the University's position on those issues is provided
by the University itself in its conclusion to the first two parts

of its brief on appeal (at 73-74).

The University there asserts

the "rudimentary principle of jurisprudence" that women and minors
are properly treated differently by the law than are men, a distinction which the University claims is the result of the law's recognition "that policy considerations justify different treatment."
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First of all, we are constrained to respond that the law will no
longer sanction different treatment of women and men, * an evolution in
the law of which the Attorney General's office is apparently unaware.
This transition in the law recognizes that its traditional treatment
of women as being under a legal incapacity, and therefore deserving of
special treatment, was based on unsound assumptions.
Most courts have likewise realized that special treatment of the
government is premised on the unsound assumption that the government
was to be given the benefit of a similar presumption of limited capacity.

It is true that minors are still given some "special" protec-

tion by the law, because they are indeed under some legal incapacity
but no similar inference should operate in favor of a governmental
body whose chief officers and governing board are sophisticated and
knowledgeable businessmen used to corporate affairs and managing
investments.**

POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL DOES APPLY TO THE UNIVERSITY. THE COURT BELOW THEREFORE ERRED IN GRANTING
THE UNIVERSITY'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING THE BROKER-DEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS.
The University relies on dicta in First Equity Corp. v. Utah
State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975) that estoppel will not
apply to a governmental entity because of acts of its "agents or
officers in excess of their statutory or constitutional powers."

*

Id.

~, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c.
§2000e (1976) Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to -8 (1974 & Supp. 1979)
(comparable to Title VII) •
**
The sophistication of the officers and Council members is a
matter Sponsored
set byforth
at some length in Appendix A to the broker-dealers'
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
original brief onLibrary
appeal.
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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at 892 (quoting 15 C.J.S. 540).

The issue of estoppel was not prop-

erly before the court in First Equity because there was no Institutional Council resolution in that record which represented the
power of the University to purchase securities, as there is in the
instant cases.
The Officers and Institutional Council Members of the University had Authority to Issue Warranties of the University's Capacity
and to Direct the University's Investment Program.
The issue of the authority or lack of authority of the University's governing agents to approve and supervise the investment program is extremely important here.

The importance of any ruling on

that issue can be highlighted by the following simple analyses.
First, as to the primary actions, the University's sole basis
for recovery is that:
1.

The purchases and' sales at issue here were made pursuant to

ultra vires contracts with each broker-dealer.
2.

The University is not estopped to recover from the broker-

dealers because, in authorizing those investments, the officers and
Council members exceeded their statutory authority.
3.

Therefore, the university is entitled to recover against

the broker-dealers.
Conversely, in the third party actions, the broker-dealers have
alleged that:
1.

If the university recovers in the primary actions, it will

be only because the subject transactions were ultra vires and because
the officers and Council members exceeded their authority.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23-

2.

If the officers and Council members exceeded their author-

ity, they must be held personally liable on those contracts on theories of express warranty, indemnity and contribution.
3.

Therefore, if the University recovers in the principal

actions, the broker-dealers must be allowed to proceed with the third
party actions.
Finally, once again highlighting the importance of this question
of authority, the primary defense of the third party defendants, and
the primary basis for the trial court's dismissal of the third party
actions, can be reduced to the following summary:
l.

The officers and Council members had general statutory

authority to supervise and approve all University investments.
2.

In authorizing and approving the subject transactions, the

third party defendants were acting within the scope of that authority.
3.

The third party actions must be dismissed because offi-

cers acting within their authority are immune from suit. *
The trial court never ruled on the question of the authority
of the officers and Council members to authorize and approve the
investment program, but it apparently believed that the officers did
exceed their authority since its ruling in the primary action is

*
The third party defendants also assert that the broker-dealers'
claims for indemnity and contribution are without merit, but they are
compelled to rely on facts outside the pleadings to begin to attempt
to assert those arguments, and because the orders dismissing the
third party action were based upon Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, all allegations of the third party complaints
must be deemed to be true (a principle they have conceded in the
opening portion of their brief), so reference to facts outside the
pleadings is improper and cannot avail them.
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based upon a finding that the subject transactions were ultra vires.
As a matter of law and equity, however, it should have been impossible
for the trial court simultaneously to allow recovery to the University on the principal actions while denying recovery to the brokerdealers on the third party actions.

Those results are diametrically

and irreducibly inconsistent, because the trial court indicated that
the primary basis for its ruling on the third party actions was that
the third party defendants enjoy the protection of official immunity.
Clearly, even as that theory is argued by the third party defendants,
they are not entitled to such immunity if they did indeed exceed
their statutory authority.

The inconsistency of these rulings is

perhaps best clarified by resort to one final summary:
1.

If the officers and members were without statutory author-

ity to approve the subject transactions, they may not invoke the
defense of official immunity (by their own admission), and the third
party actions should not have been dismissed.
2.

If the officers and members acted within their general

authority, then the doctrine of estoppel

a~

repeatedly applied by

this Court must preclude recovery against the broker-dealers by the
University.

This point is the subject of the next part of this

argument.
Before turning to an extended discussion of the application of
estoppel in these cases, the broker-dealers would also like to suggest that as a matter of sound judicial policy the traditional distinctions between "excesses of authority" and acts in "excess of
jurisdiction" are as fundamentally unsatisfactory in actual application as the traditional "distinctions" between governmental and
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proprietary action which were recently abandoned by this court in
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).
careful review of the dozens of cases involving resolution of that
question (in estoppel cases and in cases discussing the scope of
official immunity) reveals that, in actuality, those doctrines have
been invoked by the courts in order to justify an equitable result.
What finally mattered in each case was the totality of equities
on each side, including weighing of the relative interests of the
governmental party, the private party, and the degree of adverse
effect on the interests of the public of any given ruling.

In any

case where ruling for a private party would not result in serious
detriment to the interests of the government or the public, the
courts have found that officers were acting generally "within their
authority" and therefore estopped the government from recovery (in
those cases where the courts discussed that question at all).
Similarly, where the public interests would not suffer serious
detriment and the private party had been genuinely injured by government action, the courts have found that the complained of conduct of
defendant officers "exceeded their authority," and therefore denied
official immunity to the defendant officers.

A review of Utah cases

on this subject alone (within discussions of estoppel and of official
immunity) highlights the unsatisfactory nature of continuing lip
service to the phrase "excess of authority."
The broker-dealers respectfully submit that a more appropriate
approach to the question of authority in cases invoking either estoppel of the government or official immunity would simply be to weigh

-26-
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the facts and equities present in each case, to review the degree of
harm suffered by a private party in reliance on government conduct
against the degree of harm to the public in precluding recovery by
the government, and to base each ruling on those facts and policy
considerations alone.

In this era of increasing assumption of re-

sponsibility by government for its conduct, and of decreasing governmental inununity as a shield to government misconduct, such an approach
would seem to be mandated.
We hasten to add, however, that while the broker-dealers should
certainly prevail under such an alternate approach, they are also
entitled to prevail under principles clearly
law.

establi~hed

in existing

It is that existing law upon which the remaining arguments in

this brief and in the broker-dealers' original brief are based.
A Recent Decision by this Court Compels Estoppel of the University in These Cases.
This court recently held that it will apply equitable estoppel
to governmental entities.

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Con-

trol Conunission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979).

In that case plaintiff

wished to open a private club where liquor would be sold and
inquired whether the premises he had in mind would comply with a
Utah statute prohibiting the location of private clubs within 600
feet of schools and other designated places.

The Utah State Liquor

Commission issued a letter to plaintiff which advised him that the
location in question did not violate that statute, but after plaintiff had acted in reliance upon that letter the Conunission advised
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him that he would violate the statute if liquor were sold on the
premises.

Accordingly, the Commission refused to issue plaintiff a

liquor license.
The court held that the Commission was estopped to deny plaintiff a liquor license, even though it apparently was acting in a
governmental rather than a non-governmental capacity, because all the
elements of estoppel were present.

Id. at 690. Those elements were:

(1)

an admission, statement, or act inconsistent
with the claim afterwards asserted,

(2)

action by the other party on the faith of such
admission, statement, or act, and

(3)

injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
such admission, statement, or act.

Id. at 694 (footnote omitted).
The uncontroverted facts here relating to the resolutions issued
by the Institutional Council to the broker-dealers provide greater
reason for applying estoppel than did the facts in Celebrity Club.
Here, the governmental entity, the University, was clearly not acting in a governmental capacity.

Its commercial activity in compet-

ing with other buyers and sellers in the interstate securities markets
to obtain financial gain, could hardly be more proprietary.

Accord-

ingly, application of estoppel here does not give rise to the concerns
addressed by this court and others in instances where the government
is performing purely a governmental function.
Each of the elements of estoppel, as set out in Celebrity Club,
is present here:
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1.

The resolutions of the Institutional Council were "admis-

sions" or "statements" representing that the University had power to
purchase the securities at issue and the University by these lawsuits
has asserted claims which are inconsistent with that affirmative
representations.
2.

Each broker-dealer acted in reliance on "such admission,

statement, or act."
3.

Each broker-dealer will be injured by allowing the Univer-

sity "to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act"
and thereby recover judgment in these cases.
In addition, the public officials here were acting within their
authority to the same extent as was the Liquor Commission in
Celebrity Club.

There the Commission had authority to license clubs

located more than 600 feet from certain places, but it lacked authority to authorize clubs to locate within that radius.

Even so, the

Court in Celebrity Club estopped the Commission from denying a license
on the basis of a survey which showed plaintiff's club to be less
than 600 feet from a school.

In other words, the Commission was

estopped even though it lacked authority to license clubs located
within 600 feet of schools, and such approval would certainly have
been ultra vires.
Similarly, in this action, the University officials had authority to make investments on the University's behalf in securities
generally, although this Court held in First Equity that it had
authority to purchase some types of securities and not others.

While

the University may not have authority to purchase the specific types

-29-
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of securities at issue, it was within the general authority of the
Institutional Council and officers to address questions relating to
the University's investment powers and to direct some investments.*
It should also be remembered that there is no statute specifically prohibiting the University from investing in the securities at
issue, and at the time the investments were made there was no opinion
of any court in Utah stating that the investments were unlawful. (By
contrast, in Celebrity Club there existed a clear statutory prohibition on the conduct in question there).

It was not until this

Court's decision in December 1975, well after the events at issue
here had occurred, that there had been some official declaration on
the legality of these investments.
It should also be pointed out that the Institutional Council had
knowledge of the pertinent facts.

They knew they wished to purchase

equity securities and that the broker-dealers through whom they wished
to deal had a question about the University's legal power to do so.
That members of the Institutional Council may not have been aware of
the state of the law is not material, particularly when at the time
the state of the law was ambiguous.

In this connection, it is parti-

cularly inexcusable for the Institutional Council to have rested on
its ignorance when the broker-dealers had raised that question, and
when they had represented the lawfulness of the transactions to the
broker-dealers.

They necessarily implied to the broker-dealers that

they knew the transactions were lawful, when apparently they did not
know.
The third-party defendant officers and Council members so argue
at length in their brief (at 8, 10-15).
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In its brief the University attempts to undermine the brokerdealers' defense of estoppel by contending for the first time that
two broker-dealers, Hornblower and Bear Stearns, did not receive
copies of the resolution.

Though the record is uncontroverted that

both broker-dealers received such a resolution and relied on it, *
one page of the two page resolution was missing from the record on
appeal in one file and both pages of the resolution were missing from
the record in the other case.

After filing its brief the University

stipulated to supplementing the record on appeal with the missing
copies, and the Court entered an order on October 9, 1979, directing
the clerk to insert those documents into the record.

Other copies

of the same resolution were before the court below, and no one contended below that copies of the resolution had not gone to all the
broker-dealers.
The University

als~

attempts to challenge the uncontroverted

sworn statements in the record that each broker-dealer relied on the
resolution or resolutions it received.

Broker-dealers' opening brief

at 19 and references thereat to the record.

The University argues

that in some cases the resolutions were received after the brokerdealer had commenced to deal with the University.

The University did

not raise this argument below, and had it done so the broker-dealers
would have supplied facts of the industry practice of obtaining oral
assurance from a private or public corporation or customer that
appropriate authority and capacity were present and that a resolution

*

Bear Stearns, R. 1998 (Cranston Affidavit); Vol. 22, R. 1975
(Kaplan Affidavit for Hornblower).
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to that effect would be forthcoming.

These resolutions generally are

delayed because corporate boards or governing bodies generally meet
only periodically, and it is not uncommon for a month or more to pass
before a written document is received.

As in the banking industry,

the securities industry necessarily relies on the good faith of
others through oral assurances in order to take commercial action
immediately in markets that fluctuate daily.

Furthermore, as the

University did not raise this argument in the Court below, and never
controverted in those proceedings the broker-dealers' reiterated
assertions of reliance on the written resolutions, it has waived that
objection. *
In conclusion, Utah law unequivocally supports the propriety of
estopping the University from recovery here.
the majority of courts in so holding. **

Utah is consistent with

The trial court's award of

partial summary judgment on liability issues to the University should
therefore be reversed.

* As this court stated in First Equity, supra, 544 P.2d at 892 n.5:
"ordinarily, an appellant cannot raise a theory on appeal for the
first time different from that presented to the Court below." Accord,
Ream v. Fitzen, 581 P.2d 145, 148 (Utah 1978)
("this final issue was
not properly raised below and we may not consider it here for the
first time • • • • ")

** The University contends, of course, that this is untrue (at 4445), by inaccurately characterizing Professor Davis' recent treatise discussion of that subject. Once again we must point out that
Davis' most recent commentary on this subject concludes:
The law has changed. The Treatise of 1958 said that
"the courts usually hold that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel does not apply to the government." That statement was based on many cases • • . • The opposite
statement now has almost uniform support of decisions
of the 1970s: The doctrine of equitable estoppel does
apply to the government.
K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, §17.01 at 399 (1976)
emphasis supplied.
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POINT IV
THE BROKER-DEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM SHOULD PROPERLY BE GRANTED BY
THIS COURT.
By leave of court granted during oral argument on April 19,
1978, defendants refiled motions to dismiss the University's cornplaints on or about

-ma.~!&

2\if!£1

1

rn,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

1978 pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (6) of the
The motion was filed with the court

following the filing of all affidavits now in the record and the
taking of all depositions.

The court thus had before it all the

facts which are now in the record before it ruled.

Rule 12(b) pro-

vides in part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered
(6) to dismiss for failure of a pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such motion by
Rule 56.
The court did not exclude any matters outside the pleading in denying the motion.

Accordingly this court is entitled to review the

uncontroverted facts in the record in reviewing the lower court's
denial of the broker-dealers' Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss.
The University incorrectly argues beginning at page 67 of its
brief that the lower court's denial of the motions to dismiss should
be affirmed because there exist material issues of fact but only in
connection with the broker-dealers' estoppel defense.

It does not

claim there are any controverted facts relating to the brokerdealers' defense that they are entitled to prevail because monies
-33-
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paid pursuant to unlawful contracts may not be recovered.
The University asserts various "issues of fact" and allegations
of broker culpability which should allegedly negate their estoppel
defenses and thus preclude this court from entering judgment in favor
of the broker-dealers pursuant to their motions to dismiss.

Those

contentions are without merit for several reasons.
The University alleges that the broker-dealers violated broker
association rules requiring that all brokers "know their customers"
and that they reconunend only those investments which are "suitable"
for each customer (in its brief at 48-49).

It will be recalled that

the University asserted the same wrongdoing in its original federal
court actions, which the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of
with the conunent that "USU seeks to take advantage of its own wrongful acts" and that an "ultra vires act of an institutional customer
may not be converted into a wrongful act of a broker. "*

Furthermore,

the simple response to the University's allegations is that the
broker-dealers did fulfill their responsibilities under those rules,
when they sought and obtained from the Institutional Council the
written warranties of capacity and authority which expressly authcrized them to enter into each of the subject transactions with the
University's designated agents.
The University next contends that there are "issues of fact"
which would preclude ruling in the broker-dealers' favor on their
motions to dismiss.

No such issues of fact were ever raised by the

University below, and therefore have been waived.
Utah State Univ. of Agric. and Applied Science v. Bear,
&Co., 549F.2dl64, 168 (10th Cir. 1977).
-34-
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Those manufactured "issues of fact" are:
(1)

that Bear Stearns and Hornblower never received a
resolution from the University. We have shown at p.
31, supra, that it is uncontroverted that they did.

(2)

that because a few transactions were apparently
executed on behalf of the University before copies of
resolutions were received by some of the brokerdealers that there is no reliance. We responded to
this at pp. 31 & 32, supra.

(3)

That there is an issue whether broker-dealers'
knew of newspaper articles in December 1972 that
the Utah Attorney General questioned the legality
of the University's investments. We responded to
this at p. 3, supra.

(4)

That there is an issue of fact whether Donald Catron
received orders to buy no more stock in December
1972. This is not at issue. The issue rather was,
if Catron had been so instructed were the brokerdealer s so advised.
It is uncontroverted that they
were not advised that Catron's authority had been
revoked until all of the subject transactions had
been completed.*

Finally, the University implies by note 35 at page 72 of its
brief that it engaged in no discovery because the court limited discovery to a month.

Discovery was only so limited because it was the

broker-dealers who were seeking discovery in connection with the
University's motion for summary judgment and the University strenuously objected to the broker-dealers receiving any more time.

If,

in over three years in the proceedings below the University elected
not to engage in discovery, it should not now be heard to complain.
In summary, all the foregoing assertions by the University are
entirely devoid of merit, and judgment should be entered in favor of

*

Merrill Lynch, R. 1433 (Stromberg Affidavit); id. at 1422
(Dunn Affidavit); Bear Stearns, R. 1998 (Cranston Affidavit); Vol.
22, R. 1975 (Kaplan Affidavit for Hornblower); Sutro, R. 122
(Juda Affidavit).
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the broker-dealers on their motions to dismiss, for the reasons
advanced in their opening brief on these appeals.

PART TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS
POINT I
THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO
INVOKE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY TO THE CLAIMS ASSERTED BY
THE BROKER-DEALERS.
A.

The Third-Party Defendants May Not Claim Official Immunity

Because They Exceeded Their Authority in Approving the Transactions
at Issue Here.
If this court holds that the University officials were acting
outside their authority such that the doctrine of estoppel will not
be applied to the Univesity to bar its claims against the brokerdealers, then it follows that the third party defendants are not
protected by official immunity because they acted outside their
authority.

See discussion at p. 25, supra, of relationship between

the University's estoppel and the immunity claimed by third-party
defendants.

Here we assume, arguendo, in connection with the

broker-dealers' claims against the third parties that the University
is not estopped because its officials acted outside their authority *
and that accordingly the third-party defendants have no immunity.
In their effort to invoke official immunity as a defense to the
E~en if ~he University is not estopped, the broker-dealers
are s~ill entitle~ to prevail against the University under the
doctrine that monies paid pursuant to an unlawful contract may
not be recovered.
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third party complaints, the officers and members attempt a semantic
distinction between conduct "within the scope of their duties" and
conduct "within the scope of their authority" (their brief at 6, 8).
The essence of this argument appears to be that while they "exceeded
their authority" in approving the subject transactions, they were
nonetheless acting generally "within the scope of their duties" to
supervise University fiscal affairs and therefore are immune from
liability.

This distinction is semantic, not logical.

While there is some authority for the proposition that public
officers are not individually liable for simple "mistakes in the
exercise of [their] judgment," if they have statutory authority to
exercise such judgment in the first place, Anderson v. Granite
School District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 407, 413 P.2d 597, 599 (1966), it
is well-established in Utah that such officers are liable for their
torts where they are mistaken with respect to basic jurisdictional
facts and where, as a result, they take action for which they have
no valid statutory authority.

Several Utah decisions highlight this

distinction. One of the clearest examples of this principle is provided by
Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1128 (1936).

In that case

city commissioners were subject to individual liability for a tort
they committed in attempting to discharge their discretionary authority, since they exercised that authority pursuant to a city ordinance which was invalid.
Since the commissioners there directed the police to act on the
basis of an unconstitutional ordinance, the Supreme Court held that
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they were liable to plaintiffs as joint tortfeasors for directing a
trespass on plaintiffs' property.

Id. at 527-28, 57 P.2d at 1131.

The court held the commissioners to be liable because of this mistake with respect to basic jurisdictional facts even though the
defendants acted in good faith and in the exercise of their best
judgment in attempting to enforce city ordinances.

Id. at 529, 57

P.2d at 1132.
on the other hand, in Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44
P.2d 1085 (1935), state tax commissioners were held not individually liable in accepting less than the full amount of taxes due
from a hospital because they had express statutory authority to
compromise tax claims.

Accordingly, since they acted within their

authority in compromising this particular claim, they could not be
held subject to individual liability even if they made a mistake in
judgment in deciding to do so.

Id. at 385, 44 P.2d at 1089.

The foregoing distinction between acts which will or will not
give rise to personal liability of public officers is one which has
been consistently followed by this court.

In Blonquist v. Summit

County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d 430 (1971), this court held that
county officials would be personally liable to plaintiffs if they
were mistaken with respect to basic jurisdictional facts.

The court

noted that not all conduct by public officers "acting in line of
duty" is insulated from suit.

Id. at 388-89, 483 P.2d at 431.

There, the defendants decided that a certain road was public, and
they therefore directed that a locked gate on that road, maintained
by the plaintiffs, should be removed.

In fact, however, the corn-

-38-
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missioners had no authority to determine whether the road was public
or private, and their order to tear down the gate was therefore
invalid.

Id. at 390-91, 483 P.2d at 432.

Probably one of the clearest statements as to

whe~

liability

may or may not be asserted against a public officer was provided
by the United States Supreme Court in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).

The Court there noted that

"official action is [not] invalid if based on an incorrect decision
as to law or fact, if the officer making the decision was empowered
to do so."

Id. at 695 (emphasis added). In other words, if a public

officer has authority to take the action complained of, he will not
be liable for an error in judgment.

If he lacks statutory authority

so to act, however, he is liable.
In these cases, if this court affirms its holding in First
Equity Corp. v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975), it
cannot be denied that these officers and Council members lacked
basic statutory authority to authorize the subject transactions.
They did not simply exercise bad judgment in selecting specific
securities which the University had authority to purchase; their
mistake was fundamental, because the University had no power whatsoever to purchase those securities.

For this reason, they were

clearly mistaken with respect to basic jurisdictional facts upon
which they based the representations in their corporate resolutions,
and they are therefore precluded from asserting the defense of
official immunity.
Nor are the cases cited by the third-party defendants to the
contrary.

For example, in Lister v. Board of Regents of University
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of Wisconsin System, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976), cited
throughout their brief and quoted at some length at 13, four former
University of Wisconsin law students sought to recover the difference between nonresident and resident tuition which they had paid
for two school years.

Named defendants were the University System

Board of Regents and the Registrar of the University of Wisconsin.
The only "excess of authority" asserted by the plaintiffs
against the Registrar was his alleged misinterpretation of the
standards set forth in the state statutes which governed the resident/nonresident determination.

The court held that the registrar

could properly assert official immunity in response to this claim
of a simple error in judgment in exercising his valid statutory
authority, as he was expressly empowered to make the resident/
nonresident decision.

240 N.W.2d at 622.

Immediately following the text quoted by third-party defendants in their brief, the Wisconsin Supreme Court went on to state
that "there is no substantive liability for damages resulting from
mistakes in judgment where the officer is specifically empowered to
exercise such judgment."

Id.

As the third-party defendants in

these cases were not specifically empowered to exercise any kind of
judgment with respect to purchasing all the stock here at issue, the
Lister decision affords them no support.
Similarly, the third-party defendants' reliance on McQuillin's
treatise (quoted at 20 of their brief) for the proposition that
public officers will not be held liable on contracts which they
execute is also misplaced.

Again, almost immediately following the
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passage quoted by third-party defendants, McQuillin states that "if
public officers in making contracts go beyond or exceed the authority given them, they may become personally liable."
Municipal Corporations §12.214, at 171 (3d ed. 1979).

4 McQuillin,
Similarly,

McQuillin notes that an officer may be "held liable for the injurious consequences of his discretionary acts when he exceeds his
authority."

Id. §12.201.

McQuillin warns that:

An officer may pay out public money only in
the manner prescribed by law. Money disbursed
by him in an unlawful manner is paid out at his
peril. Accordingly, where funds are disbursed
illegally by public officers or upon their
authority, they are personally liable therefor,
e.g.,
payments under illegal contracts

Even the fact that illegal expenditures were
made by officers under the honest belief that
they were authorized does not prevent recovery
from such officers.
Id. §12.217, at 181 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
For the foregoing reasons, the third-party defendants must not
be allowed to invoke official immunity as a shield for their conduct in these cases.
B.

Sound Judicial Policy Requires That These Public Officers

be Subject to Personal Liability for the Conduct Complained of by
the Broker-Dealers Herein.
As the foregoing argument demonstrates, the third-party defendants' assertion that they are entitled to official immunity is unsupported at law.

Similarly, sound judicial policy requires that

their conduct give rise to liability in these cases.
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The officers and members assert the usual timeworn policy arguments that official "immunity has been deemed necessary to ensure
that public officials are free to exercise their duties unencumbered
by the fear of damage suits growing out of the performance of
(their] duties."

Third-party Defendants' Brief at 7.

This argu-

ment should not avail them here for several reasons.
First of all, the liability which the broker-dealers here assert
is no greater than the liability which could successfully be asserted
against members of governing boards of private corporations, or other
private individuals.

Consistent with recent holdings by this court

and others, there is no sound policy basis for allowing public officers to be held to a lower standard of honesty and responsibility in
their business transactions than the standard to which private
individuals are held.

See,

~'

605 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah 1980)

Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.,

(in which this court adopted a

policy expressly designed to allow more citizens injured by tortious
governmental conduct access to the courts for redress); Celebrity
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control commission, 602 P.2d 689, 695
(Utah 1979).

These actions are based upon common law principles of

indemnity, restitution, and contribution which could successfully be

I

:

asserted as to private individuals, and which should also be allowed
against public officers.

J

The "fear of damage suits" which the officers and members
assert would attend the imposition of personal liability on public
officials is also illusory.

As Justice Stewart recently pointed out

in Standiford, where a public entity (or officer) is protected from

-42-
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that liability by insurance purchased by the sovereign, this concern
has no basis.

As Justice Stewart explained:

The insurance authorization is relevant as to
whether a governmental entity should be subjected to liability on tort claims because one
historical fear of limiting immunity has been
the unexpected and unplanned-for expense to the
public entity. With the availability of insurance protection, coupled with the statutory provisions for a ceiling on liability, governmental
entities may confidently and accurately budget
for their potential tort liability.
Id. at 1235.
Similarly, Section 63-30-33 of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act specifically authorizes the purchase of insurance by any governmental entity to insure any or all of its employees against liability for injury or damage.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-33 (1978).

Such

insurance was purchased for each of these third-party defendants by
the state.

Indeed, counsel for third-party defendants were employed

by the insurance carrier.

if the purchase of liability insurance

authorized by the Immunity Act was not considered by the legislature
to constitute a waiver of employees' common law official immunity,
at least to the extent of the coverage, the legislature would simply
have been authorizing gifts in the way of premium payments to the
insurance companies.

Manifestly, this result is absurd and it must

be concluded that the purchase of insurance waived immunity for the
officers and members.*
Finally, the officers and members assert that they cannot be
held individually liable here because the Institutional Council

*

This position was argued at length to the court below in
the defendants' joint memorandum opposing the motions to dismiss
the third-party complaints, at 16-21.
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itself is the only defendant which can properly incur such liability, as the individuals did not act individually but instead
acted as a body in executing their corporate resolutions (their
brief at 20).

In fact, no law is offered to support any such pro-

position, because no such law exists.
Furthermore, however, there could be no conceivable policy
basis for such a conclusion.

That is, there can be no rational

basis for holding that conduct which would give rise to liability
if done individually will suddenly be insulated from liability
simply because more than one person joined in to perform the same
act.

Indeed, at least one Utah decision suggests that the proper

method for asserting liability in such cases is to sue the various
public officers as joint tortfeasors, where several officers have
acted in concert in order to take action on behalf of the public
entity.
C.

Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah at 527, 57 P.2d at 1131.
The Officers Must at Least be Held Personally Liable for

Failure to Perform Ministerial Functions.
As the broker-dealers asserted in the court below and in their
original brief in these cases (at 72 & n.211), the broker-dealers
stated a cause of action against the officers and members for failing to notify them for several months of their revocation of
Catron's authority, a purely ministerial act.

As noted by the

officers and members in their brief at 6, it must be accepted as
true for purposes of this appeal that Catron's authority was revoked
on December 4, 1972, but no notice of that revocation was given
the broker-dealers until March 1973.

-44-
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The officers and members do not argue in their brief that there
is no liability for such conduct, so we assume that they have conceded the merit of this assertion.

Accordingly, the officers and

members should at least be held personally liable to the brokerdealers for all damages attributable to the time period between
December 1972 and March 1973.
POINT II
THE BROKER-DEALERS' CLAIMS FOR INDEMNITY STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION
The officers and members contend that the broker-dealers failed
to state a cause of action for indemnity because they were in fact
equally as culpable as those officers and members (in their brief
at 17).

That assertion cannot avail them on this appeal for several

reasons.
First, the well-pled

f~cts

set forth in the pleadings must be

deemed to be true for purposes of this appeal. *

In its complaints

against the broker-dealers, the University merely alleges that the
broker-dealers faithfully carried out the instructions of one of
the third-party defendants, Donald Catron, who in turn was expressly
empowered to enter into the subject securities transactions by these
officers and members.
The broker-dealers alleged in the third-party complaints that
they acted in reliance on the Institutional Council warranties of
authority and capacity in entering these transactions, that they
did not know that the University lacked such authority, that the

*

Discovery was not commenced until after the court granted
the third-party defendants' motions to dismiss.
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third-party defendants were negligent or grossly negligent in failing to determine that these securities transactions might be ultra
vires, and that the broker-dealers were purely innocent agents for
the University.
Under that state of pleadings, the broker-dealers have clearly
asserted that the officers and members were more culpable in entering these transactions than were the broker-dealers.

Under such

circumstances, as the officers and members have conceded in their
brief (at 17), a cause for indemnity is properly asserted.
Finally, the broker-dealers are less culpable than the officers and members as a matter of law, since the only "wrongdoing"
with which they are charged is the assertion that they had constructive notice of the illegality of these transactions.

As argued at

some length in the broker-dealers' original brief on these appeals
(at 66 and at nn.120-25), the brokerdealers must be relieved of the
burden of constructive notice in these cases because they justifiably relied on express warranties of authority and capacity directed to them by these third-party defendants.

At bottom, the only

grounds for asserting that the broker-dealers had such constructive
knowledge is that they were dealing with the sovereign, and it is
proper, so the implied argument goes, to invent some theory to protect the sovereign and its officials.

This raises the same issue

regarding archaic and unjustified sovereign privileges addressed by
this court in Standiford.

The "constructive notice" argument ad-

vanced by the third-party defendants is simply a disguised way of
claiming the benefits of sovereign immunity without giving reasons.

-46-
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POINT III
THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINTS STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR COMMON LAW CONTRIBUTION
As an alternative to their claims for indemnity, the brokerdealers have alleged that they are at least entitled to contribution from the third-party defendants if the trial court should
eventually determine that the broker-dealers are equally as culpable as those third-party defendants.

The officers and members

have responded (in their brief at 21-22) that the broker-dealers'
claims for contribution state no cause of action because these
actions arose before May 8, 1973, the effective date of the Utah
contribution statute.
The doctrine of contribution rests upon "principles of equity
and natural justice."

18 Am. Jur. 2d Contribution §4 (1965).

The

general rule is that one wh? is compelled to pay or satisfy the
whole or to bear more than his fair share of a common burden or
obligation, upon which several persons are equally liable or which
they are bound to discharge, is entitled to contribution against the
others to obtain from them payment of their respective shares.
Restatement of Restitution §81 (1937).
There is a right of contribution for acts occurring prior to
the enactment of Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Ann., permitting contribution between joint tortfeasors.

Contribution was permitted

prior to the Act in cases where the wrongful act of the person
seeking contribution was not intentional or negligent.

The later

Utah contribution statute simply expands the circumstances under
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which contribution is allowed, to include recovery against tortfeasors.
In Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 44 P. 833 (1896), plaintiff
was a trustee for defendant with respect to certain property.

Def-

endant told the trustee that the property was wrongfully possessed
and requested that appropriate legal action be conunenced.

An action

was commenced and a judgment was entered ejecting the occupier of
the premises.

Subsequently, however, the ejected occupier brought

suit in trespass, claiming that the conunissioner hearing the case
did not have proper jurisdiction to do so.

A judgment was entered

against the trustee.
The trustee (Culmer) then brought an action against defendant
for contribution, alleging that his participation in the initial
action was done in good faith in the firm belief that the commission
hearing the trespass action had proper jurisdiction, and at the
express direction of the defendant.

The court concluded that

where a "tort is one arising from construction or inference of
law, and not arising from a known meditated wrong," the person
charged with liability because of constructive knowledge could
recover contribution from the person at whose direction he was
acting.

Id. at 141, 44 P. at 836.

Similarly, in these cases, if the broker-dealers are held
liable to the University because they are charged with constructive knowledge that these transactions were ultra vires, they should

!
l
l

J

I

be entitled to conunon law contribution from the persons at whose
direction they acted, i.e., these officers and Council members.

-48-
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Similarly, in Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P. 512 (1903),
the court found that plaintiff's liability-creating conduct had been
innocent in purpose, and therefore his action for contribution
stated a cause of action.

There, plaintiff acted in good faith upon

defendant's representation that plaintiff could take possession of
certain chattels upon which defendant had a chattel mortgage.

In

taking possession he was not aware that his actions constituted a
tort.

While no one can "relieve himself from the consequences of

having intentionally committed an unlawful act by seeking ••
contribution," the court noted, it is also true that "justice and
sound policy" require that contribution should be allowed where
the party held liable was acting upon the affirmative representation of another and where he did not know that his conduct was
illegal.

Id. at 449, 73 P. at 514.

The cases relied upon by the third-party defendants are not to
the contrary.

In both of those cases, the plaintiffs sought con-

tribution for their own negligent or willful misconduct, and this
court therefore barred contribution.

Brunyer v. Salt Lake County,

551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976); Hardman v. Matthews, 1 Utah 2d 110, 262
P.2d 748 (1953).
POINT IV
THE BROKER-DEALERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED
ON THE THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS EVEN IF THIS COURT
REVERSES THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
ENTERED BY THE COURT BELOW IN FAVOR OF THE UNIVERSITY AND GRANTS THE BROKER-DEALERS' MOTIONS
TO DISMISS THE UNIVERSITY'S CLAIMS.
The officers and members assert (at 24) that the broker-dealers
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cannot "maintain an action over if they are not held liable in the
first instance."

The broker-dealers respectfully submit, however,

that they should be allowed to recover all costs and expenses of
litigation they have incurred and to proceed even if they prevail
on this appeal in opposing the University's claims against them.
so to hold would be consistent with the majority view in this
country.

McCormick on Damages, §66 at 246, §67 at 248 ("Breaches

of official duty may likewise subject the victim to the necessity
of engaging in litigation, for the expense of which he may recover
from the officer"), §68 (recovery for the expense of litigation is
allowed in indemnity cases)

(1935).

The sole case cited by third-

party defendants is inapposite because (1) that court never stated
either that the third-party complaint prayed for indemnity or that
it prayed for recovery of costs and counsel fees, and (2) even if the
court had so held on this issue, that holding would have been clearly
contrary to the majority view and sound policy.
v. United States, 270 F.2d 80, 84 (5th Cir. 1959)

southern Milling co.
(cited by third-

party defendants at 24).
As Moore points out in discussing Rule 14 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (identical to Utah R. Civ. P. 14), Rule 14 is procedural only and in no way modifies substantive right.
Federal Practice, 1114.03(3)

(2d ed. 1979).

3 Moore's

I f the right to indemnity

or contribution properly exists, Rule 14 merely provides "the procedure for its enforcement."

Id. at 14-158.

In successful suits for indemnity the indemnitee is entitled
to reimbursement by the indemnitor for all damages sustained, in-

-so-
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eluding costs and attorneys' fees incurred in defending the primary
action.

~,

McCormick, supra.

A recent decision by the Oregon

supreme Court aptly summarizes this general principle:
The rule in most jurisdictions, regardless of
whether indemnity is based upon an implied or an
express agreement, is that when a claim is made
against an indemnitee for which he is entitled
to indemnification, the indemnitor is liable for
any reasonable expenses incurred by the indemnitee
in defending against such claim, regardless of
whether the inderr~itee is ultimately held not
liable. Paliaga v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 301
F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1962); Miller and Company
of Birmingham v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 328 F.2d
73, 78 (5th Cir. 1964); Southern Arizona York
Refrigeration Co. v. Bush Mfg. Co., 331 F.2d 1,
60 (9th Cir. 1964); O'Connell v. Jackson, 273
Minn. 91, 140 N.W. 2d 65, 69 (1966); Commercial
Standard Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 86 Ariz. 288, 345
P.2d 210, 216 (1959); Restatement, Restitution
§ 80, Comment b., 356.
We so hold.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Crosetti Bros., Inc., 256 Or.
576, 475 P.2d 69, 71 (1970)

(emphasis added).

Accordingly, the third-party actions should be revived even
if the court dismisses the University's complaints against the
broker-dealers.

PART THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING MERRILL LYNCH'S
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE AND THE OTHER BROKERDEALERS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION.
POINT I
BECAUSE THE ACTION AROSE IN AND MERRILL LYNCH
RESIDES IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, VENUE IN CACHE
COUNTY IS NOT PROPER AS TO MERRILL LYNCH.
Merrill Lynch asserts that the cause of action arose in Salt

Lake County and the University asserts that it arose in Cache County.
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In its brief, the University argues that the cause of action arose
in cache County since the "wrong" occurred there, i.e., payment was
made from Logan by a Logan bank acting as agent for Merrill Lynch.
The University's arguments are incorrect.
A.

A Cause of Action Arises Where the Defendant's Wrongful

Act occurs.

Any wrongful Acts Allegedly Committed by Merrill Lynch

Must Have Occurred in Salt Lake County.
The cause of action arises where the defendant's allegedly
wrongful acts or omissions occurred.
53 P. 991 (1898).

Bach v. Brown, 17 Utah 435,

The wrong alleged against Merrill Lynch in the

case sub judice is that from 1970 through 1973 Merrill Lynch unlawfully engaged in the purchase and sale of securities pursuant to
instructions given it by the governing body of the University.

In

asserting that acceptance of the University's funds by Merrill Lynch
in Logan constituted the "wrong" for purposes of determining where
the cause of action arose, the University ignores the relatively
more significant portions of the allegedly illegal transactions in
question.

See Akichika v. Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930, 539 P.2d 283

(1975) (an action for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of a
conditional sales contract, use of bank as an agent for transfer of
title merely incidental to and not an integral part of transaction at
issue).
The University focuses on the last technical act necessary to
complete the whole transaction, i.e., acceptance of payment for the
securities, which should have little relevance to evaluating whether
venue is proper.

Indeed, the stock collection transactions were
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nothing more than "routine clerical matters."

(Hornblower, R. 664).

To argue that no wrong occurs until payment is accepted, as the
University asserts, is naive.
The University mischaracterizes Merrill Lynch's position as
relying upon acceptance of purchase orders in Salt Lake County as
the sole portion of the transaction constituting the "wrong" (University's brief at 97).

Such a characterization ignores Merrill

Lynch's brief, which stated that "Merrill Lynch assented to the
transactions in question from its place of business in Salt Lake
County, and all other actions taken by it in this state on the University's behalf occurred there."
(emphasis added).

(Merrill Lynch Brief at 76)

In other words, Merrill Lynch's acceptance and

execution of the University's orders constitute the wrong Merrill
Lynch allegedly committed.
The University's complaint is in accord with this assertion,
since it claims that it was damaged as a consequence of Merrill
Lynch's execution of orders for the purchase of securities.
Merrill Lynch R. at 2, ,,,, 9, 13).

~·

(See,

Since Merrill. Lynch exe-

cuted the transactions in Salt Lake County, where it conducts its
Utah business, any wrongful acts or omissions necessarily occurred
there.
The original brokerage agreement was entered into in Salt Lake
County; all orders to buy and sell were placed by Merrill Lynch from
its Salt Lake offices; while conducting the transactions in Salt Lake
County, Merrill Lynch allegedly failed to make any investigation of
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the university's corporate authority; Merrill Lynch received payment
in Salt Lake County; and Merrill Lynch has its only place of business
for this state in Salt Lake County.

(Merrill Lynch, R. 21, 22, 28,

30, 31, 32).
Even if it were shewn that Merrill Lynch did in fact accept
transfers of funds in Logan (by the University transferring money to
a bank in Logan which it designated which in turn passed the money
on to Merrill Lynch in Salt Lake County), it is not uncommon for a
defendant in a complex transaction to have contacts in different
judicial districts.

When faced with such situations, the courts

"have fashioned what may be called a 'weight of contacts' approach."
Ghazoul v. International Management Services, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 307,
314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

The court in that case further stated:

"[T]he weight of defendant's contacts in the various
districts concerned must be compared, and the
claim must be deemed to have arisen in the district where the contacts had been most significant."
• • • "The cause of action for venue purposes can
be said to arise wherever substantial material
events took place.
Id. at 315 (citations omitted).
In the present case, the "weight of contacts" for venue purposes
lies in Salt Lake County.

All material events surrounding the alleg·

Ii
L

edly unlawful sale and purchase of securities necessarily occurred in
Salt Lake County where Merrill Lynch conducts all its Utah business.
(Merrill Lynch R. 31, 32).
Finally, the University ignores the clear policy of the venue
statute, which by offering the alternative of the county where the
defendant resides or in which the claim arose, places venue in those
counties which would be most convenient to the defendant.

Utah
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I

code Ann. §78-13-7

(1977).

The statute conspicuously omits as an

alternative the county where the plaintiff resides.
B.

Merrill Lynch Did Not Receive Payment in Cache County

and the Logan Bank Was Not an Agent of Merrill Lynch.
The preceding section demonstrates that even if Merrill Lynch
had received payment in Cache County, venue is not proper there.

In

fact, however, all payments to Merrill Lynch were accepted in Salt
Lake County.
Merrill Lynch received payment by mail from the University
(Merrill Lynch R. 96, 98).

Even the University concedes that in a

number of cases Catron mailed checks to Merrill Lynch in Salt Lake
which were drawn on the University's bank in Logan (University's
Brief at 94).

It follows that Merrill Lynch only accepted payment

when it received those checks and cashed them in Salt Lake.
On other occasions, Catron would request that Merrill Lynch
send securities to a Logan bank he had selected (University's Brief
at 95).

The bank would then request approval and funds from the

University and, upon receiving them, would transmit the money to
Merrill Lynch by mail (id.).

Again, Merrill Lynch received payment

only upon receipt of those funds in Salt Lake City.
Nevertheless, the University argues that the bank in Logan
(designated by the University) was an agent for Merrill Lynch;
therefore, payment was accomplished either upon the University's
transfer of funds to its own designated bank or upon its approval for
the bank to transmit funds to Merrill Lynch.

The University bases

this argument on a strained interpretation of the banking rule that,

-55-
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prior to the time of settlement, a collecting bank is an agent or
sub-agent for the owner of an item.
(1968).

Utah Code Ann. §70A-4-201(1)

This provision was not intended to resolve venue questions.

Indeed, Official Comment (4) to the Uniform Commercial Code cites
several other purposes or results flowing from Section 201(1), ineluding the resolution of any risk of loss disputes.
Furthermore, even if the Logan banks were deemed to be collecting banks rather than payor banks, the Uniform Commercial Code states
at §70-8-313(1)

(1968) that delivery of a security to a purchaser

"occurs when he or a person designated by him acquires possession of
a security."

Under this provision, it is clear that the deli very to

the University occurred when the Logan bank received the securities,
since Catron designated the bank as the University's agent.
Lynch, R. 96 and 98).

(Merrill

The University's reliance on §70A-4-201(1) is

misplaced since that section states that a bank is the agent of the
"owner" and according to §70A-3-313(1) the University became the
owner upon delivery of securities to the Logan bank.

This is also

~
I

made clear by §70A-8-313 (2), which provides that "[t] he purchaser is
the owner of the security held for him by his broker. "

Accordingly,

under the provisions of the UCC, which the University considers controlling (though we believe irrelevant), the Logan bank, as the
agent of the "owner", was clearly the agent of the University, not
of this defendant.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
OVER BEAR STEARNS, HORNBLOWER AND SUTRO.
The lower court erroneously held that Bear Stearns, Hornblower
and Sutro were subject to in personam jurisdiction on the basis of
"contacts" with this state which consisted of advertisements in
national periodicals and the mailing of securities, confirmation
slips, and monthly statements to the University in Logan
randurn Decision, Bear Stearns R. 293).

(Memo-

In its brief the University

further notes that these broker-dealers conversed by telephone with
University employees concerning the transactions at issue, and that
two of the three broker-dealers had registered as such with the Utah
Securities Commission -- Hornblower registered prior to the transactions at issue and Bear Stearns registered subsequent thereto.
the basis of these contacts the University erroneously argues that
the broker-dealers are subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah
under both the "doing business" and the "significant minimal contacts" tests, Utah Code Ann.
A.

§§

78-27-20 and 78-27-22 (1977).

The Broker-Dealers Were Not "Doing Business" in this

State nor did they have Significant Minimal Contacts Here to Subject Them to In Personam Jurisdiction.
The broker-dealers are not properly subject to in personam
jurisdiction in this State under either test.

Under the "doing

business" test, the contacts proffered by the University do not
satisfy the "solicitation plus" rule, especially since the brokerdealers cannot be deemed to have engaged in the solicitation of
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On

business in this state for a long time and in a continuous, systematic manner.

None of the broker-dealers, nor any of their officers,

employees or agents, has ever maintained offices, telephones, telephone listings, office equipment, employees, agents, bank accounts,
records, or the like in the State of Utah (Sutro, R.39, 41; Bear
Stearns, R. 60, 100; Hornblower, R. 36-37, 39, 75).

It is clear the

broker-dealers were not doing business in Utah; the University,
rather, was doing business in California.

It voluntarily decided to

conduct its stock purchasing business in California rather than in
Utah.

It opened accounts with agent-brokers in California, main-

tained its accounts there and authorized the purchase of stocks in
those accounts (Hornblower, R. 20, 38; Sutro, R. 36-37, 40, 42, 44;
Bear Stearns, R. 51, 151, 61, 261). From California and New York,
the University's orders were executed and the securities purchased
(Hornblower, R. 74; Sutro, R. 39; Bear Stearns, R. 100).
Nor do the broker-dealers' contacts with the State of Utah
constitute the significant minimum contacts required by the long-arm
statute.

The University has not shown that the broker-dealers

engaged in substantial activities within the state beyond the
insignificant and incidental contacts mentioned above.

The contacts

relied upon by the University and the court below do not constitute
significant minimum contacts in the State of Utah such that the
maintenance of the suit in this State does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."

International Shoe

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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The University erroneously contends that the case sub judice
is somehow squarely controlled by the decision in Piantes v. HaydenStone, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 110, 514 P.2d 529 (1973).

The court in that

case did not state that the telephone calls to Utah from the defendant's offices in California were sufficient contacts for asserting in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant.

The holding, rather,

turned on numerous telephone solicitations into Utah together with
at least eight personal solicitations in Utah.

In the present case,

on the other hand, there were telephone conversations between the
University in Utah and the broker-dealers in California, but the
broker-dealers did not travel to Utah to solicit the sale or purchase of securities.

Rather, Catron traveled to California on

several occasions to deal personally with the broker-dealers.

The

instances of physical presence in Piantes, as in so many other
cases, made the quality and, nature of the nonresident defendant's
contacts much less likely to offend due process considerations than
in the present case, where such contacts are lacking.
The University attempts to distinguish the cases relied on by
the broker-dealers in their earlier Brief.

Nevertheless, the Univer-

sity's distinctions are not persuasive and those cases still support
the broker-dealers' contention that they should not be subject to in
personam jurisdiction in this State.
B.

The Broker-Dealers Did Not Engage in Purposeful Acts

Within This Forum Sufficient to Justify This State's Assertion
of Personal Jurisdiction.
The University relies on the fact that two of the broker-dealers-Hornblower and Bear Stearns--registered with the Utah Securities
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-59-

conunission, and, by virtue of that contact, jurisdiction over them is
warranted.

This fact, however, is not relevant in this context.

The

provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act state that registration
with the Conunission constitutes irrevocable consent of service in
any action which arises under that act.
§ 61-1-26 (6)

&

(7)

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.

(1978).

Such registration does not bring the broker-dealers within the
long-arm statute.

This is made clear in Koplin v. Saul Lerner Co.,

52 Ill. App. 2d 97, 201 N.E.2d 763 (App. Ct. 1964).

That case is

particularly pertinent because, as the University states in its
Brief, the Utah long-arm statute was modeled after the Illinois
statute.

There, the court held that the state had no personal juris-

diction over nonresident broker-dealers even though they had registered in Illinois.

"Registration with the Secretary of State did

not bring the defendants within Section 17 [the 'doing business'
provision of the Illinois long-arm statute], nor did it vest jurisdiction in Illinois." 201 N.E.2d at 767.
The University also makes the tenuous argument that jurisdiction
over the broker-dealers is warranted on the basis of the trade name
protection this state affords a person if that person files an application in the office of the secretary of state.

There is no evidence

presented to the effect that the broker-dealers have purposefully
acted to avail themselves of this protection.
c.

Notions of Fair Play and Justice Dictate That Personal

Jurisdiction in this State Should Not Be Asserted Over the BrokerDealers.

-60-
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The University also relies on the extent to which the brokerdealers engage in interstate commerce for support of its contention
that litigating in Utah will not result in inconvenience, expense,
and prejudice for the broker-dealers.

The University's claim is

premised on the broker-dealers' registration in numerous states, as
well as their advertisements in nationally circulated periodicals.
such activities do not suffice to demonstrate that anyone is engaged
in interstate commerce to such an extent that he would not be inconvenienced by defending an action in a foreign state.

On the con-

trary, mere registration and advertising do not demonstrate that a
person has even begun to engage in any business whatsoever.

See

id. (registration merely indicated plans and preparation f?r doing
business in Illinois; advertising merely indicated desire and hope of
doing business there).

Where the broker-dealers' total contacts with

this forum are quite insignificant, and where they have not been
shewn to be engaged extensively in interstate commerce, it seems
patently prejudicial and inconvenient for the broker-dealers to
defend an action in the State of Utah.
The University also argues that since public money was involved
in the transactions at issue the broker-dealers should be required to
defend in Utah.

Whether public money is involved is irrelevant to

the question of whether due process notions are offended.
The University also relies on the fact that the broker-dealers
advertise in national publications, some of which are circulated in
Utah.

The University found no advertisements by the broker-dealers

in Utah media because they do not advertise in Utah.

(Bear Stearns,
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R. 100).

However, national advertising of the kind done by the

broker-dealers is no basis for jurisdiction in Utah.

The Utah Legis-

lature has recognized that it would be unfair and unreasonable to
require foreign broker-dealers to register in Utah simply because
they advertise in national publications which reach Utah.
An off er to sell or to buy is not made in this
state when the publisher circulates or there is
circulated on his behalf in this state any bona
fide newspaper or other publication of general,
regular, and paid circulation which is not published in this state, or which is published in
this state but has had more than two-thirds of
its circulation outside this state during the
past 12 months • • • .
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26 (4)

(1978).

National advertising therefore not only fails to meet a "doing
business" test, but does not even constitute an offer to do business.
No person should be subject to personal jurisdiction in a foreign
state in which he does no business simply because he advertises in
prestigious national business publications to reach markets where he
does do business.
The University erroneously asserts that the use of the services
of Utah banks "would certainly seem to be doing business in the State
of Utah."

It is uncontroverted that the University, not the broker-

dealers, designated the banks in Logan, Utah to accept stock certificates and to transmit the University's money to the broker-dealers'
banks in California and New York.
R. 120; Bear Stearns, R. 100).

(Hornblower, R. 73 and 74; Sutro,

That Utah banks agreed to act for the

Univesity should not suffice to establish in personam jurisdiction
over the broker-dealers.

Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court in Akichi~
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v. Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930, 539 P.2d 283 (1975), refused.to find the
defendant to be "doing business" even though one of defendant's
contacts with the forum state consisted of the use of an Idaho bank
to transfer title to the truck involved in that controversy.
see also Hamilton Brothers, Inc. v. Peterson, 445 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir.
1971)

(no personal jurisdiction where defendant's contacts with forum

state included deposit of money in a bank in that state).
Finally, to support its argument that sufficient contacts
exist, the University asserts that the broker-dealers solicited
business from the University, relying on telephone calls in which the
brokers recommended that the University purchase or sell particular
stocks.

In addition, the University relies upon the Sutro-sponsored

seminar in California which Catron attended as further evidence of
solicitation on the part of Sutro.
The broker-dealers did not solicit business from the University;
rather, the University, through Catron, initiated the relationship by
opening accounts in California

(Sutro, R. 36-37, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45,

123; Hornblower, R. 20, 38; Bear Stearns, R. 151, 261).

Subsequent

telephone conversations occurred during the course of the University's
transaction of business with the broker-dealers in California in
which some securities were actually recommended.

In Sutro's case,

however, it is uncontroverted that it recommended none of the
securities purchased by the University (Sutro: Affidavits of Juda,
40; Johnson, 42; and Dyckman, 44).

Finally, the University relies on Industrial Commission v.
Kemmerer Coal Co., 106 Utah 476, 150 P.2d 373 (1944), for the pro-
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position that "very little more" than solicitation is necessary to
constitute "doing business."

In that case, however, the defendant

maintained an office in Utah with agents in this State, and the
defendant made a "regular and continuous attempt to solicit sales of
its coal to consumers in Utah through these employees."
479-80, 150 P.2d at 374-75.

Id. at

Thus, the activity in that case was of

longer duration and of a far more continuous, systematic nature than
that of these broker-dealers here.
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's ruling denying
these appellants' motions to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction should be reversed.
DATED this

/

11"-'-day

of April, 1980.

, .-,

,,~,/'I",

KATHLENE w. LOWE
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Third-Party Plaintiffs

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-64-

APPENDIX A

Cases cited by the University to support its assertion that
government may always recover ultra vires payments are treated in
this Appendix.

As this discussion reveals, those cases are all

distinguishable from the circumstances present here.

Most signi-

ficantly, none of them raise issues of estoppel or of express
warranties by the public body as is the case in these appeals.

In

addition, most of them treat instances where the private party was
asked to return an outright gratuity or where the private party had
committed some clearly wrongful act.

None of them supports recovery

in the cases at bar, and the broker-dealers also respectfully submit
that Utah law (understandably not relied upon by the University on
these issues) is by itself controlling and must lead to judgment in
their favor.
The University (at 24) cites Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83,
124 P. 2d 34 (Cal. 1942) as allowing a taxpayer "to recover money
already paid a contractor for work done pursuant to a contract which
had been let without following bidding procedures."

What the Univer-

sity fails to point out, however, is that there were allegations of
fraud, conspiracy, and collusion between county officials and the
contractor to pad bills and bilk the public treasury for services
that were not needed and not performed.

Since the appeal to the Calif-

ornia Supreme Court was from a judgment for dismissal in favor of the
county, the court had to accept those allegations as true.

That

case, then, illustrates the classic situation in which the ultra
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vires doctrine is applied:

that is, where corruption is involved.

In the instant case, there is neither any evidence nor even a veiled
allegation of anything other than good faith on the part of the
broker-dealers.
In its brief at 26-27, the University cites State v. Axtell,
393 P.2d 451 (N.M. 1964) for the proposition that "[t]he state could
recover monies expended pursuant to a seemingly valid legislative
enactment which was later declared unconstitutional."
understandably silent as to the facts of the case.

The brief is

It involved

legislation allowing the state of New Mexico to put up money,
matched by federal funds, for the purchase of hay and feed grain for
ranchers whose animals were endangered by harsh winter weather.

The

statute was subsequently held unconstitutional as a donation of
public funds.

Recovery was sought against ranchers who had bene-

fited from a gratuity, and not from those who had provided the
services -- the feed sellers.

Far from supporting Respondent here-

in, Axtell suggests that the University's remedy must be against
those members of the

usu

faculty, staff and student body who re-

ceived the benefits from the early years of the investment program.
At 27-29 of its brief, the University discusses and quotes
extensively from Gerzof v. Sweeney, 264 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Ct. App.
1965), 276 N.Y.S.2d 485 (S.Ct. 1966), 286 N.Y.S.2d 392 (S. Ct.
1968), modified at 289 N.Y.S.2d 392, and 239 N.E.2d 521 (Ct. App.
1968).

As the University states the facts, "in that case, a con-

tractor installed a generator for the village of Freeport pursuant
to a contract held to have been awarded in violation of state
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bidding law."

(Brief at 28).

But, as the court explained, the

violation involved "(s]pecifications •

prepared 'with the

active assistance of a representative of the defendant Nordberg'
and were 'so slanted as to make impossible a bid . •
manufacturer.'"

239 N.E.2d at 522.

by any other

As in Miller v. McKinnon,

supra, the seller of goods and services was a wrongdoer, entitled to
no equitable consideration.
While the University quotes the admonition of the Gerzof court
to the effect that under those circumstances the Village might be
entitled to retain the generator and the contractor forced to repay
all money received, the court's actual holding was:
[T]he patently illegal conduct of the defendants
entitles them to little consideration, • • • the
amount to be awarded should be less than [the full
amount received]. We may adopt this course, in
the unusual circumstances of the present case,
without disturbing the salutory rationale and
policy [of enforcing competitive bidding statutes] • • • • The sheer magnitude of the forfeiture that would be suffered by the defendant
Nordberg, as well as the corresponding enrichment
that would inure to the Village of Freeport, ••
adds an element to this case not to be found in
any of those in which the principles • • • have
been applied •
• . The purposes of our competitive bidding
statutes may be fully vindicated here without our
rendering so Draconian a decree as to subject the
defendant Nordberg to a judgment for over three
quarters of a million dollars. Justice demands
that even the burdens and penalties resulting from
disregard of the law be not so disproportionately
heavy as to offend conscience.
239 N.E.2d at 524.
The remedy allowed by the Gerzof court was payment by the defendant
of the difference between the price for the expensive equipment that
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he wrongfully induced the Village to buy, and the price of less
expensive equipment the Village had desired before defendant's machinations began.

Gerzof, then, does not mandate recovery in a good

faith situation, nor does it even mandate a full recovery from an
active wrongdoer.
The other New York cases cited by Respondent as following
are similarly inapposite.

~

S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 32

N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 105 (1973) did indeed decree that the recipient
of public funds should return every dollar and take nothing for the
services it performed.

But in that case, the City and company offi-

cials had been convicted of bribery.

The court observed that there

was no "untainted" proof that any work was needed, so it considered
forfeiture an appropriate remedy.
In Cupid Diaper Service Corp. v. New York City Health & Hospitals
Corp., 86 Misc.2d 116, 381 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1976), the court
simply invalidated an oral modification of a written contract, and
declared the money received thereunder to be a setoff against claims
the company made against the hospital.
In Lance Investigation Service, Inc. v. City of New York, BB
Misc.2d 117, 387 N.Y.S.2d 32 (App. Div. 1976), there was dicta about
the right of a governmental agency to recover funds spent pursuant to
an invalid contract, but the court held that the contract in question
was valid, and granted summary judgment to plaintiff for the value of
its services.
As for the federal cases which the University asserts as following Gerzof, Fabrizio & Martin, Inc. v. Board of Education, 290 F.
Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), denied a contractor's suit for damages
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-stemming from an alleged breach of an invalid contract.

The court

denied the school board's counterclaim for all money paid under the
contract, and remanded the case for determination of damages consistent with Gerzof, which, it is again pointed out, does not mean a
forfeiture of all money received for services actually rendered.
Board of Education v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 453 F.2d 264
(2d Cir. 1971), was a related action against a surety in the same
case.
At 30-32 of its brief the University cites, without explanation,
28 cases which it claims "hold that a public body may recover payments made ultra vires."

A review of the facts of each of those

cases indicates that Respondent's statement of the law is badly
misleading.

This brief will conform to the numbering system used by

the University.
1.

J.W. Bateson Co.' v. United States, 308 F.2d 510 (5th Cir.

1962) -- Here, a contractor, ,through various artifices, managed to
sell the same item to the government twice, each time at a profit.
The action was to force disgorgement of the second profit made.
the court said, "This case boils down to unjust enrichment."
at 514.

As

Id.

The recovery involved was for services not performed, a

situation which does not exist in the present case.
2.

Stone v. United States, 286 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1961) -- In

this case, the United States recovered payments made to a wood grower
who was erroneously certified as eligible to participate in a federal
support program.

The recipient of the payments had done nothing to

earn the money.
3.

State v. Fourth National Bank of Columbus, Ga., 117 So. 2d
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145 (Ala. 1959) -- This was an action to recover payments made to
road contractors pursuant to a contract let in violation of the
competitive bidding statutes.

The court mentioned in dicta that the

contractors could not enforce such an agreement, but it sustained a
demurrer denying any recovery of funds.
4.

Reliance Insurance Co. V. Alaska State Housing Authority,

323 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Alas. 1971) -- The state recovered progress
payments erroneously made to a bank instead of to the surety, which
had assumed responsibility for work begun by an insolvent contractor.
Again, this case stands for the proposition that a public entity may

recover funds mistakenly paid to one who has not performed any service,
5.

Mackey v. McDonald, 504 S.W.2d 726 (Ark. 1974) -- This case

was a dispute over the earmarking of federal revenue-sharing funds
for a court's "contingency" account.

No services were involved.

The

appropriation was sustained.
6.

Mayes Printing Co. v. Flowers, 154 So.2d 859 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 1963) -- A contractor who installed a counter in a courthouse in contravention of competitive bidding statutes was required
to return the purchase price.
7.

He was allowed to remove the counter.

Polk County v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., 262

F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1959) -- After paying life, health and accident
insurance premiums for its employees for several years, the county
became aware that such payments were apparently illegal under provisions of the Georgia Constitution prohibiting employee benefits in
excess of the statutorily prescribed salary.

The county did not seek

a full recovery of all premiums paid, but asked that it receive the
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difference between the premiums it paid and the amount the insurance
company paid out in benefits to county employees.
volved was some $14,000.

The amount in-

The Circuit Court, strictly applying what

it believed to be Georgia law, allowed that recovery of money received minus money paid out.

That decision provoked an outraged

dissent from Chief Justice Hutcheson.

While conceding that his two

fellow judges had decided the case according to their interpretation
of Georgia law, he remarked:
If, on the other hand, the majority • • • had
held that the correct way to decide it as a case
of first impression was to deny liability and
permit the county to avoid payment for the insurance, the benefits of which it had received,
thus welshing on its agreement, I should content
myself with saying that the decision was neither
morally nor legally right, and, in sueport, should
point to the uniform course of authority to the
contrary • . • •
Id. at 492.

It is submitted that Judge Hutcheson's summary of the

issues is equally applicable to this case.
8.

State v. McCarty, 279 P.2d 879 (Idaho 1955) -- The state

recovered retirement benefit overpayments mistakenly made to judges
under a misinterpretation of a statutory amendment.

The excess was,

at best, a gratuity to which the judges were not entitled, and for
which they had rendered no additional service.
9.

National Fire Insurance Co. v. Butler, 152 N.W.2d 271

(Iowa 1967) -- This case involved private parties, and is completely
inapposite.
10.

State v. Rucker, 126 A.2d 846 (Md. 1956) -- In this case, a

discharged employee had been reinstated and awarded back pay.

The

employer deducted the amount of unemployment compensation received
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during the wrongful layoff from the back pay award.

The state

successfully reclaimed the amount of the unemployment compensation,
because its retention would have unjustly enriched the employer.
11.

Dunne v. City of Fall River, 104 N.E.2d 157 (Mass. 1952)

This was an ultra vires contract under which the city agreed to
pay a promoter for inducing businesses to locate in that city.

The

city sought to recover funds paid prematurely, when businesses had
promised to move to the area and subsequently failed to do so.
Despite the ultra vires nature of the contract, the city neither
sought nor received the return of any funds for any services that
were actually performed.
12.

City of Saint Paul v. Dual Parking Meter Co., 39 N.W.2d 174

(Minn. 1949) -- This was a competitive bidding statute violation
involving the installation of parking meters, in which the city and
installers operated in defiance of an injunction.

The court speci-

fically found that the parties were not acting in good faith, but it
still forced the city to return a certain amount of money to the
contractor.
13.

The University cites dicta in a dissent.

J.S. Love Co. v. Town of Carthage, 65 So.2d 568 (Miss.

1953) -- In this case, the governmental entity illegally contracted
with an agent to handle legal and technical problems involving the
sale of bonds to finance a natural gas transmission system.

It

sought a recovery of the conunission paid the agent, minus the
agent's expenses, and received that award.

While this case is some-

what favorable to the University, there is an important factual
difference in that the agent solicited and initiated the contract
with the town, whereas here, Utah State solicited and initiated the
business.
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-14.

County of St. Francis v. Brookshire, 302 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.

1957) --

An

attorney was forced to return money paid him by a county

to defend several county employees in their individual capacity on
the basis that the individuals, not the entity, had the responsibility of making such payment.
by defendant for the county."
15.

"[T]here were no services performed
Id. at 5.

City-Wide Asphalt Co. v. City of Independence, 546 S.W.2d

493 (Mo.Ct. App. 1976) -- The court resolved this construction dispute by finding that there was no valid contract.

The company took

nothing from the city, and vice versa.
16.

Fulk v. School District, 53 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1952) -- A

school district, in an action later determined to be ultra vires,
purchased a home for its superintendent of schools.

The court

ordered rescission of the conveyance, with the vendor returning the
purchase price and the school district returning the property.
However, the court considered the possibility that the property might
have declined in value during the years it was held by the school
district.

To account for that possibility, it allowed the original

vendor, at his option, to keep the money and force a sale of the
property, with the proceeds from the sale to be turned over to the
school district.

The court held that if the sale generated insuffi-

cient money to compensate the school district for those funds wrongfully expended, the trustees would pay the difference.

Court costs

and interest on the money were also taxed to the trustees, as was
the cost of any sale of the property.

Appellants submit that this

was an equitable and sensible approach to situations where restoration of the status quo would not be possible due to the decline in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-73-

value of the things wrongfully purchased from the good-faith supplier.
17.

Consentino v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 433 F.2d 1274 (8th

Cir. 1970) -- This case involved the right of a citizen to bring a
derivative antitrust action on behalf of the city.

The court ob-

served in dicta that a citizen may have standing to bring an action
to recover tax funds spent illegally, but could not bring a derivative antitrust action.
18.

Opinion of the Justices, 175 A.2d 396

(N.H. 1961) -- A

state which had wrongfully overpaid mileage allowances to its legislators was allowed to recover the excess.
that they would more readily allow a

The justices suggested

recov~ry

of this sort against

public officials than against private individuals or corporations.
19.
1955)

Thornton v. Village of Ridgewood, 111 A.2d 899 (N.J.
A city's contract to buy a building was challenged as ultra

vires on the basis that the city's plans for the structure would
violate zoning ordinances.

While the court in dicta mentioned rules

concerning void contracts, it held that this one was valid because a
municipality could change its own zoning ordinances.
20.

Shebell v. Strelechi, 249 A.2d 10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

Div. 1969) -- The state recovered money it had paid to the victim of
an accident involving an uninsured motorist when the recipient of the
funds subsequently was compensated by his employer.
21.

Rider v. Lenoir County, 78 S.E.2d 745

(N.C. 1953) -- This

case did not involve the recovery of public funds in any way.

Plain-

tiff had enjoined a construction project during a period of falling
costs and the contract was subsequently relet at a substantially
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lower price.

He sought attorneys' fees fer having saved the tax-

payers the difference.
22.

He did not get them.

Horner v. Chamber of Conunerce, 72 S.E.2d 21 (N.C. 1952)

Plaintiff was awarded attorneys' fees for bringing an action that
forced the Chamber of Conunerce to return money wrongfully paid to it
by the city.

The return was ordered because the

Charr~er

performed no

services fer the appropriation.
23.

Town of Bennettsville v. Bledsoe, 84 S.E.2d 554 (S.C.

1954) -- The defendant contractor acknowledged that he had been
overpaid on a job.
24.

The town recovered the excess.

Hauck v. Bull, 110 N.W.2d 506 (S.D. 1961)

The South

Dakota Supreme Court reversed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
in favor of a contractor, and held only that a taxpayer had standing
to bring a claim that public money had been illegally expended on the
contract.
25.

The case did not reach the merits of the issue.
Carlson v. City of Faith, 67 N.W.2d 149 (S.D. 1954)

Several city councilmen were required to return money they had been
paid for goods and services sold to the city in contravention of a
statute making it a misdemeanor for any city official to deal with
the city in any way.

The case held that forfeiture of all money

received was an appropriate remedy to a criminal transaction.
26.

Crass v. Walls, 259 S.W.2d 670 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953)

Here, a small tcwn illegally contracted with a garbage disposal
service owned by the mayor and his brother.
this specifically violated state law.

As in the previous case,

The city recovered the one-

half of the money paid to the mayor, but his brother, who was innocent of any wrongdoing, was allowed to keep his half.
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27.

State v. Continental Baking Co., 431 P .2d 993 (Wash. 1967) ..

This case is precisely the sarr.e as State v. Rucker, supra.

The state

recovered unemployment compensation payments from an employer.
28.

Leuch v. Egelhoff, 38 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1949) -- Here, a

sununary judgment for the defendant was reversed, and the plaintiff
taxpayer was granted standing to sue.

The merits of the case were

not addressed.
Appellants regret the need for the foregoing lengthy exposition
of the University's authorities.

However, Appellants cannot allow

such gossamer to be elevated into "well-settled" law.

As the Uni-

versity's authorities indicate, a total forfeiture such as the University seeks in this case had

~

been ordered absent criminal

activity, proved or presumed.

Furthermore, even partial forfeitures

have been extremely rare.
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of Appellants was hand delivered this

~regoing

~~y

Reply Brief

of April, 1980

to each of the following:
Michael L. Deamer, Attorney General's Office,
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah,
attorney for Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied Science;
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Michael Heyrund, of
Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main Street, 12th
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, attorneys for
certain third-party defendants;
Melvin E. Leslie, George M. Mecham and David L.
Wilkinson, 10 West Broadway #430, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101, attorneys for Legislative Council;
This is to also certify that a
Brief of Appelants was mailed this

cop~

/{'

the foregoing Reply

~ d~y

of April, 1980 to

each of the following:
Harold G. Christensen and L. Brent Stephens, of
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 701 Continental
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, attorneys for Bosworth Sullivan;
Darwin c. Hansen, 845 So. Main Street, Bountiful,
Utah 84010, attorney for third-party defendant
Donald A. Catron;
Lyle W. Hillyard, 175 East 100 North, Logan, Utah
84321;
David R. Melton, of Karon, Morrison & Savikas, Ltd.,
5720 Sears Tower, 233 So. Wacker Drive,
Illinois 60606.
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